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SCHISM IN GREEK SOCIETY UNDER AXIS 
OCCUPATION: AN INTERPRETATION 
The occupation of Greece between April 1941 and November 1944 by 
Germany and its allies. Italy and Bulgaria, provoked civil strife of 
remarkable intensity. The hatred which arose between the antagonists 
often exceeded that which most Greeks felt for the occupying forces. 
Thus on their own admission the leaders of the communist-dominated 
National Liberation Front (EAM) hated the Greek collaborationist 
troops more even than the latter's German patrons (Grigoriadis, 1964: 
5. 150). The co-leader of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), Giorgis 
Siantos, referred even to rival resistance groups as "scum" (Chatzis, 
1977-1979: 2.503). The main group to which he referred, the National 
Democratic Hellenic League, EDES, was, according to a close observer. 
"certainly more concerned about EAM than about the Germans" 
(Baerentzen, 1982: 150). The Greek collaborationist forces tended to be 
still more ruthless than the Germans in fighting against EAM and its 
army ELAS (Fleischer, 1980-1982: 194). For George Papandreou over-
seas (the prime minister of what was widely recognised, in the last six 
months of the occupation, as the legitimate government) a major 
preoccupation was "the extension of the terroristic occupation of Greece 
by EAM" (papandreou, 1945: 125). Civil strife flared up immediately 
after the German withdrawal. According to convincing sources, about 
1,800 people were massacred by ELAS at Meligala in Messenia; while 
at Kilkis in Macedonia, 6,000 ELAS forces incurred 356 casualties in 
destroying an army of 9,000 collaborators. 1 
The factors which produced such conflict are still poorly 
understood, although some scholars-notably Hagen Fleischer, John 
Hondros and Giorgos Margaritis-have revealed valuable evidence.2 
Among their findings are the complexity of motives for participation. 
I Daskalakis. 1973: 1.202, 208, 216; Mitsopoulos, 1987: 404-407. 
2Hondros. 1983: 119-120; Fleischer. 1980-1982: 191-192; 
Margaritis. 1989: 505-515. 
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and the resulting heterogeneity of the opposing sides. The lines of 
division cut across most of the obvious fissures in Greek society before 
the occupation-between social strata, regions, ethnic groups, and the 
dominant political camps, the mainly republican Venizelists and the 
mainly monarchist s. 
Yet one pre-war division persisted, that between the KKE and the 
traditional political and social hierarchy represented by both political 
camps. This division acquired central importance during the occupation, 
being modified when the KKE won allies by creating EAM. The 
schism was manifest by December 1942, when, at a KKE conference, 
Siantos declared his firm opposition to the desire of most politicians to 
restore "the old bourgeois regime" (Chatzis, 1977-1979: 1. 329). 
Communist cadres, holding as they did the key posts in EAM, began to 
see it as the prototype of a new form of government. The reaction by 
the diverse representatives of the old order was expressed by the quisling 
prime minister Ioannis Rallis when he wrote, retrospectively, of the 
spring of 1943 : 
The foundations of our social order were quaking. The state had 
to prepare for its defence, if it was to live. It was certain that 
the great empire [Britain], which by sentiment and 
geographical position had always been the protector of Greece, 
would not tolerate the rule of criminal and subversive 
elements. (Rallis, 1947: 42; my translation) 
By 1944, those holding such views had enough in common for the 
terms ethnikofron (of sound patriotic opinions) and ethniki parataxis 
(national camp) to be used to describe anti-communists in general} In 
most areas, EAM activists now wielded sweeping and to them 
unaccustomed powers, while the national camp was visibly embodied in 
the respectable society and official establishment of the larger towns 
(Arseniou, 1977: 2.209). In their struggle for survival, the opposing 
sides strove to recruit supporters from all regions, most social strata, 
and various political parties. Thus the complex alignments which 
appeared throughout the country, during the occupation, were largely a 
consequence, direct or indirect, of the strategies adopted by the 
3Kanellopoulos, 1977: 418, 590; Chatzis, 1977-1979: 2. 179; Papa-
stratis, 1989: 535. 
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competitors for national power. 
The complexity of alignments was increased by the localisation of 
political life during the occupation. Travel by road or rail was severely 
disrupted; radios scarce because most were confiscated by the enemy or 
EAM; and newspapers strictly censored by the enemy or by EAM. Thus 
political leaders had difficulty in controlling distant branches of their 
respective organisations. The leaders of EAM, and of some opposing 
organisations, were for long periods dispersed between Athens and the 
provinces. For their part, the rank-and-file members of each 
organisation knew little about other groups apart from the distorted 
accounts by their Own leaders. The result, noted by the British observer 
C.M. Woodhouse, was that on both sides there was a cleavage between 
the protagonists in the struggle for national power, who felt some sense 
of direction, and their rank-and-file followers, who usually had no desire 
for civil war and were little influenced by ideological motives. 
(Woodhouse, 1948: 57-58). 
The prize in the power-struggle was control over the state, which 
-by comparison with those of other non-totalitarian regimes in pre-
war Europe, even in the Balkans--was remarkable for its centralisation, 
and the extent of its influence over society. This fact lent extraordinary 
importance to Athens as the metropolis. Another feature, shared by 
other Balkan states before the war, was an extensive spoils system 
giving the ruling party control over most branches of the state 
including the armed forces and police, which had been repeatedly purged 
by successive parties in the twenty-five years before 1941. Based on an 
-and therefore right-wing-establishment built up since 1933, the 
dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas (1936-1941) had increased the state's 
powers to an unprecedented extent.4 However it shared key 
characteristics of preceding, parliamentary regimes. One was implicitly 
to accept the hegemony-economic and military-of the Western 
powers, chiefly Britain and Germany. The other characteristic was to 
treat the KKE as beyond the pale. In persecuting it, Metaxas's police 
minister, Konstantinos Maniadakis, utilised the experience acquired by 
the police under previous governments, Venizelist and, and pulverised 
4Close, 1990a; lelavich, 1983: 2. 240; Mouzelis, 1978: 24, 99; 
Mouzelis, 1986: 9-12, 31-32, 42. 
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the party's organisation. By 1940, the great majority of communist 
cadres were in captivity, while most other members were discredited 
among their comrades by having signed public recantations.5 
EAM was the response by the KKE to the Axis invasion and the 
subsequent deterioration of governmental authority. The few party 
members who were at large when the Germans invaded, with thousands 
of dilosies (members who had won their liberty by recanting) still loyal 
to the party, were gradually reinforced by escapees from jails and prison 
islands. Eventually an estimated 670 out of 1,870 cadres escaped, not 
including the party leader Nikos Zachariadis who was deported to 
Germany.6 The construction of EAM was in large part due to the 
initiative of lower-ranking communist cadres, in their attempt to resist 
the enemy and also satisfy the needs of the population. Sectors of EAM 
established in this largely spontaneous way were the relief organisation 
National Solidarity (EA); the village councils and tribunals which 
multiplied from mid-1942; the neighbourhood committees in Athens 
which appeared in 1943; and many of the guerrilla bands which 
prevented requisitions of food by enemy troops. The early establishment 
of the trade union federation Workers' National Liberation Front 
(EEAM), in July 1941, was due to the traditional skill of urban cadres 
in this type of work. When EAM was founded as a national umbrella-
organisation in September, the KKE was still in effect leaderless, 
because the future co-leaders, Giorgis Siantos and Giannis Ioannidis, 
had not yet escaped from jail. When they did, they found an 
organisation which to a considerable extent had a momentum of its 
own.? 
Junior cadres could take such action because few were in doubt 
about the party's broad strategy: a continuation of the Popular Front 
policy adopted on orders from the Com intern in 1935 and continued, as 
far as possible, under the Metaxas dictatorship. The policy demanded 
5So1aro, 1975: 119, 122-124; Chatzis, 1977-1979: 1. 52-53; 
Elefantis, 1976: 257. 265-266. 288-289. 
6Chatzis. 1977-1979: 1. 93; Fleischer. 1988: 142-143; Solaro. 1975: 
123. 
7Chatzis. 1977-1979: 1. 68-69. 76-78. 93-94; 2.339; Arseniou. 
1977: 1. 21-36; Peponis. 1970: 59; Zepos. 1945: 1-2; Zoidis et al .• 1967: 
235; Bouras. 1983: 53. 
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alliance with a broad spectrum of opinion against "fascism" (i.e. the 
dictatorial right), and remained especially relevant because one of its 
original motives was defence of Greek territory.8 The KKE leaders 
failed, however, to win over any parties other than the small groups-
socialist or agrarian-which co-operated in founding EAM. They 
continued as late as December 1943 to seek co-operation with bourgeois 
politicians, and tried to prevent EAM activists from offending powerful 
interest groups, for example, ordering respect for the property rights of 
landowners. the prerogatives of the Orthodox Church, and the pre-war 
legal codes. The most significant concession by the KKE leaders was to 
accept British patronage of the organised resistance, and the prospect of 
British hegemony after liberation. Here they swallowed their repugnance 
for British "imperialism", being forced to do so by the pro-British 
feelings both of the population, and of the non-communists who 
formed most of EAM's membership. The communist leaders also 
concealed their control of EAM, in deference to the massive prejudice 
which persisted against them, even among radical Venizelists alienated 
from the pre-war political system. The KKE control of EAM soon 
became common knowledge in the political hot house of Athens; but in 
most rural areas it seems to have remained little known for much of the 
occupation.9 
The policy of conciliating other parties began to conflict with the 
very success of EAM. Being professional revolutionaries, and operating 
in a vacuum of government authority, the communist cadres at all 
levels created a political system which systematically displaced the old 
one, without apparently worrying how to reconcile this process with 
their leaders' desire to win over bourgeois politicians. As a result of the 
party's efforts, EAM came to exercise authority of some sort or another 
over most of the population through its army, police, terrorist squads, 
law courts, local government, taxation, newspapers, services for health 
and education, and its system of communications and food distribution. 
After local activists established grass-roots organisations, they called for 
80rigoriadis. 1964: 5.245-246; Partsalidis. 1978: 15-18; Fleischer. 
1988: 140; Arseniou. 1977: 1. 30-32; Katiforis. 1989: 501. 
9Fatsea, 1989: 491-493; Zalokostas, n.d.: 150; Mitsopou}os, 1987: 
124. 127; Anagnostopoulos. 1950-1973: 2. 326. 
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co-ordination of their efforts at a regional level, and later at a national 
level. The culmination of this process was the formal establishment in 
August 1943 of a national army (ELAS), and in March 1944 of a 
provisional government (PEEA). ELAS, although it began in the form 
of guerrilla bands, was intended by its founders, in November 1941, to 
be organised eventually as a regular army. This, when it appeared, had 
professional officers, regiments, divisions, and a central command. 
PEEA was flanked for a time by a popularly elected parliament, and 
issued printed decrees and its own currency,lO 
The mass of party cadres even at senior levels tended to treat EAM 
as a revolutionary government, rather than the basis for a post-war party 
in a pluralistic political system. For example, a member of the party 
politburo, Dimitrios Glinos, told the prominent politician 
Themistoklis Sofoulis in September 1943 that EAMIELAS, including 
its projected provisional government, were permanent, and that other 
parties would have to join them. ELAS representatives, including the 
military commander Stefanos Sarafis, when countering British criticism 
that ELAS was too large and centralised for guerrilla purposes, made it 
clear that its purpose was to liberate the whole country including the 
capital, and to prevent thereafter the return of a right-wing dictator-
ship.ll After the establishment of PEEA, communist cadres in ELAS 
announced that "the people in arms had acquired its revolutionary 
authority", and organised discussions among troops of the country's 
reconstruction after liberation. Meanwhile local activists destroyed the 
old system of government where they could, forcing police in most 
regions to withdraw by stages from the villages to the centres of larger 
towns, burning their archives, and, by a campaign of assassinations and 
kidnappings, preventing important posts like those of nomarch from 
being filled.12 The fascist enemy was interpreted by EAM as including 
senior officials both of the quisling administrations and of the Metaxas 
dictatorship. Nor were other resistance organisations, or their news-
10Bouras, 1983: 55-57; Chatzis, 1977-1979: 1. 209; PEEA, n.d.: 27; 
Couvaras, 1982: 30-31. 
llChatzis, 1977-1979: 2.195; Arseniou, 1977: 1.366-370; Mitso-
poulos, 1987: 104-105; FO 371/37208/155, R 12299. 
12Daskalakis, 1973: 1. 188, 200, 286; Hondros, 1983: 149; Zalo-
kostas, n.d.: 289; Mitsopoulos, 1987: 104-105, 212. 
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papers, tolerated by EAM-even after the liberation-in any areas save 
a few which its opponents controlled militarily. 13 
The KKE leaders could not decide how to reconcile this unfolding 
revolution with their aim of conciliating the bourgeois parties and their 
British patrons. Consequently they lurched between phases of defying 
the British (October 1943 - January 1944, and June - July 1944) and 
phases of submission to them (June - August 1943, and August -
November 1944). Despite the communists' apparent revolutionary 
proclivities, the effectiveness of their organisations attracted some 
eminent allies: for example, ELAS attracted officers like Sarafis, and 
PEEA attracted the participation of professors such as Alexandros 
Svolos. But then, in mid-1944, the KKE leaders found that by defying 
the British they risked alienating Svolos and the large body of middle-
class opinon which he represented, inside and outside EAM. As a 
result-and probably, too, because of the attitude expressed by Soviet 
delegates-they decided to send representatives to the Cairo government 
ofPapandreou in August 1944.14 
A weakness of PEEA, in confronting the Cairo government, was 
that it was supported by a very small minority of those with leading 
positions in pre-war society. The bulk of the official establishment 
remained attached to the camp. Most politicians were actually repelled 
by the organisational success of EAM, because they could neither 
compete with it nor win followers within it. Admittedly, the 
organisational success of ELAS attracted about 1,850 professional army 
officers; but of them two-thirds-including the great majority of senior 
officers-had been out of action since 1935, when they were purged for 
complicity in a Venizelist uprising. Many had since then shared with 
communists the experience of persecution by the s; and some had, 
partly as a result, adopted socialist views of some kind: examples being 
Sarafis, and the member of PEEA Evripidis Bakirtzis.15 
At the lower levels of several professional groups, EAM had 
13FO 371/43694, 43695, 43699; Peponis, 1970: 54-55, 123; 
Zalokostas, n.d.: 91. 
14Chatzis, 1977-1979: 2. 276, 283-285, 317-318, 463-465; Joannidis, 
1979: 210-215; Bouras, 1983: 51, 128; Zalokostas, n.d.: 261; Stavrakis, 
1989: 16-17, 23-32. 
150erolymatos, 1989: 293; Elefantis, 1976: 244; Sarafis, 1980: 40-46. 
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greater success, securing the partIcIpation, from patriotic and 
humanitarian motives, of hundreds respectively of parish priests, 
school-teachers, intellectuals, lawyers, and doctors. Professionals who 
were alienated in some way from the pre-war establishment were 
probably attracted by EAM's general opposition to traditional privileges 
(such as the status of the official form of the language, katharevousa). 
Among students at universities and high schools, the followers of EAM 
seem to have numbered many thousands. Among clerical workers, they 
seem to have numbered tens of thousands, and to have formed some of 
the best organised trade unions in EEAM. Their radicalism was 
obviously due in part to the extreme scarcity of basienecessities dUring 
the occupation, which proletarianised much of the lower middle 
classes. 16 The strong support for EAM among many with intellectual 
training or interests illustrates R.V. Burks' conclusion, based on studies 
of Greece and other underdeveloped countries, that such people tended to 
be especially disturbed by their own countries' backwardness and 
poverty in relation to the Western powers, and especially attracted by 
the communists' promise of political participation and of mOdernisation 
in the economy and social services. The key activists in rural areas 
tended to be professional people, such as the high-school teacher of 
literature who single-handedly built up the organisation in Eulroea. The 
appeal of EAM to the educated, and its dependence on the printed word, 
seems to explain why in many areas iltended to be supported by the 
more prosperous of workers and peasants. Conversely the fact that 
EAM in Macedonia was opposed almost solidly by the Tourkophone 
refugees from Asia Minot seems to be have been due to their 
backwardness and social isolation, which apparently discouraged EAM 
from seeking their support and made it easier for the 'enemy to woo 
them. Thus prominent leaders of anti-EAM bands in Macedonia-
Anton Tsaous, Mihalaga, Kisa Batzak-had Turkish noms de guerre. 17 
16Zoidis et al., 1967: 193, 524-525, 534; Logothetopoulos, 1948: 
131-132; Sakellariou, 1983: 57, 66-68. 
17Anagnostopoulos, 1950-1973: 2. 1: 324; Grigoriadis, 1964: 3.27-
29, 32. 55; KE tou KKE, 1981: 1.94; Konstantaras. 1964: 71; Burks. 
1971: 27. 63-64, 71-72; Thomadakis, 1981: 73; FO 371.37201/162. R 
2569; Hondros, 1983: 120; Zoidis et al., 1967: 488-492; Margaritis, 1989: 
508; Mitsopoulos. 1987: 183. 
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Part of EAM's promise of modernisation was the emancipation 
from patriarchal authority of youth and of women. Young people as in 
other occupied countries were especially drawn to resistance, perhaps 
because they had less to lose and were more idealistic than adults. They 
were enrolled in a nation-wide youth organisation-a counterpart to the 
now defunct movement established by the Metaxas dictatorship-
which played a vital role. for example. providing 60% of ELAS in 
1944. Women were promised full equality after liberation, and were 
widely employed, though relatively little in leading roles, and 
disproportionately in relief work and the commissariat.18 
-~'~Elitegroups which EAMdid not even try ~to w()o were the major 
~4~pstrialists, merchants, and bankers. They were condemned by 
communist ideology as exploiters and representatives of Western 
interests. They were also alienated by the communists' success in 
organising employees of various kinds. Such organisation was, for 
coffifilUIiists, a traditional area of expertise to WhiCh they were biased by 
ideology, and also in many cases by their own social origin. During the 
~'~upation, EAM in the cities and provincial towns organised frequent 
,ancloften successful strikes-sometimes on a massive scale-for aims 
which included higher pay, better food rations, and the cessation of 
InbOiltconscription. Still more direct means were used to extract goOds 
from the wealthy. In many parts of the country EAM commonly led 
~'1'&;;;;;e;f,A >', , ",' ' ',' " 
woil(ers or peasants in raiding the storehouses of merchants accused of 
~Ql~k-marketeering. EAM also took over the pre-war police function of 
controlling prices of basic necessities. Rich people were commonly 
'S"ulrjectedto'demands for protection money. Some of the largest donors 
to EAM were businessmen making profits from contracts for the 
't1eirii~iis, and reinsUring themselveS by donating to 'EAM against the 
risks of German departure.19 
On the margins of the capitalist class were small-scale employers 
and retailers who were socially hard to distinguish from workers, 
because the majority of the latter were employed in family enterprises 
. ~,,}8Sweets, 1986: 167; Dedijer. 1974: 609; Peponis, 1970: 57; 
'Ffilscher, 1988: 311;KE tou'EAM. 1943: 33. . 
19Zoidis et al., 1967: 107-108, 111. 114. 116. 142-145. 182-186, 
·Z1:3';:385~386;Thomadakis. 1981: 77-7S; Laiou. 1989: 305; Zalokostas, 
n.d.: 57. 162; FO 371/37207/222. R 11750. 
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and were of recent peasant origin. Thus many small-scale employers in 
towns belonged integrally to communities which were dependent on 
EAM's welfare services and dominated by its methods of coercion. Also 
favourable to EAM were locally prominent businessmen in some 
communities dominated by EAM-for example, in Roumeli, the 
Thessalian plains, Euboea, and Lesbos. In some of these cases, support 
for EAM apparently became identified with regionalloyalty.20 
In the countryside, an overtly class-based strategy was impossible, 
because owners of relatively large estates were of negligible importance 
and rural society was dominated by smallholders. In this society, it was 
normal for a family or village to act as a unit. Where villages were 
divided within themselves, economic stratification was only one of 
several possible causes of division, and probably more important in the 
Peloponnese and Roumeli, where land distribution was more unequal. 
Thus some relatively wealthy peasants were alienated by the 
progressively rated taxation, or forced requisitions, of EAM, or by its 
insistence on higher wages for labourers. A different sort of division 
was the split in Karpofora (Messenia) between two camps each 
consolidated by inter-marriage, and aligned before 1941 with Venizelists 
and s respectively. The village of Imera, in western Macedonia, split 
because it actually contained two communities, each consisting of 
refugees from different parts of Asia Minor. Economic links were often 
significant. For example, some members of Kalarrytes, in the Pindus 
ranges, supported ELAS because they traded with Thessaly, while all 
the inhabitants of Syrako, only about four hundred yards away across a 
gorge, supported EDES be~ause they traded with Epirus. In other cases, 
political divisions derived from family feuds. Sometimes the reasons for 
choice of allegiance were purely personal. An ELAS officer, for 
example, mentions one soldier who, having made a girl pregnant, was 
forced by his battalion commander to marry her, and in resentment 
against this coercion, later deserted and became leader of an anti-
communist band.21 The multiplicity of motives produced complex 
2oOaskalakis, 1973: 809; Grigoriadis. 1964: 4.439; Arseniou, 1977: 
1. 344; 2. 228-229; Anagnostopoulos. 1950-1973: 2.325-326; NARS 
868.00/7-2347. dispatch 17. 
21 Aschenbrenner, 1987: 115; Baerentzen, 1982: 157; Margaritis, 
1989: 506, 508; Konstantaras, 1962: 97. 
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geographical pauerns, in which villages of apparently similar social 
character but opposed loyalties might be intermingled, as in parts of 
"Laconia or western Macedonia.22 
As EAM expanded, it encountered stronger opposition in some 
'regions than in others. In apparently aU provinces, EAM grew earliest 
and won the most enthusiastic support in larger towns, presumably 
'because of communists' experience in trade union organisation, and the 
facilities in towns for printed propaganda and other means of mass 
·communication.23 The organisation of women aroused less opposition 
in towns than in villages, partly perhaps because women were more 
. likely to work outside the home. Later in the occupation, the centre of 
.EAM power shifted to some extent. Its army ELAS strengthened its 
hold on most rural areas, while in many small towns the EAM 
organisation was forcibly suppressed by the enemy helped by Greek 
Gollaborationist troops. By these means, in Macedonia in 1944, the 
enemy dominated the market towns of Florina, Kastoria, Kozani and 
Nigrita, while EAM/ELAS controlled many of the surrounding villages 
(KE tou KKE, 1981: 1. 92,94). 
Diverse factors influenced EAM's chances of initial expansion in 
,the countryside. Its early expansion in Roumeli was due at least in part 
.to the local connections of Aris Velouchiotis, who proved himself an 
able guerrilla leader. In the Thessalian plains, the party benefited from 
the radical tradition of peasants who had earlier in the century gained 
their land after struggle against oppressive landlords, and in the process 
won the sympathies of urban intellectuals. But in the mountains of 
western Thessaly EAM/ELAS suffered from lack of this tradition, and 
found, interestingly, that the local klephtic tradition was no help to it. 
In Macedonia, EAM benefited from the communists' pre-war strength 
among industrial workers and tobacco workers in towns. In western and 
central Macedonia, EAM also benefited, after mid-1943, from the 
sympathy of most Slavophones, whom it allowed to form their own 
22Margaritis, 1989: 512-513; NARS RG 84, 1945, W.H. McNeill, "The 
political embroglio". n.d. 
23Margaritis, 1989: 512; Papathanasiou, 1988: 2.608-609; 
Grigoriadis, 1964: 3.290; FO 371/37205/113, R 9254; Peltekis archive, 
file 6, G1.7, Capt. M. Ward, "report on visit to Greece, 21 Oct. to 25 Dec. 
1943". 
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organisation and communicate with their compatriots in Yugoslavia. 
But this sympathy provoked strong antagonism from some Greek-
speaking inhabitants, including many of the Asia Minor refugees, who 
associated Slavs with Bulgarian and Yugoslav expansionism. Those 
refugees, however, who came from the Caucasus region were pro-
Russian and so favoured communism. In southern Greece and Crete, 
where the Slav menace was less immediate, EAM was strongly 
supported by the refugee communities, presumably because they had 
been radicalised by their loss of status in the 1920s, and now formed 
much of the urban working class. In eastern Macedonia and Thrace, the 
severity of the Bulgarian occupation crippled resistance until 1944 when 
the Bulgarians' authority was weakened by German reverses on the 
Russian front. An additional obstacle, in Thrace, was the presence of 
Turkish Muslims, who were indifferent to Greek quarrels. Much of 
Epirus was held against EAM by EDES, which was strongly reinforced 
by the British. In the Peloponnese, EAM was hindered by especially 
strong German forces, and also by a monarchist tradition, sustained by 
traditionally close links with the official establishment in Athens. In 
Crete, EAM was hindered by the fact that there, more than generally on 
the mainland, non-communist community leaders bestirred themselves 
relatively early in resistance.24 
However, what is also impressive about EAM is the widespread 
character of its appeal. EAM organised people to defend their living 
standards and prepare for a better society after liberation. Thus it won an 
enthusiastic response from many villagers as well as townspeople, in 
nearly all regions, even among communities which before 1944 had 
very little contact with its leadership, like the towns in Evros and the 
exiles in Egypt. This response enabled EAM to build up ever stronger 
organisational resources-including welfare services, trained cadres, and 
repressive machinery-allover the country. At the end of the 
occupation, these organisational resources were so great that they 
overwhelmed many of the pockets of resistance which remained. 
24 Anagnostopoulos, 1950-1973: 2, 1: 320; Arseniou, 1977: 1. 137-
138· FO 286/1165, British Consul-General in Salonika to Leeper, 14 Apr. 
1945; 286/1166, anon. "notes on Crete, 26 Mar.-6 Apr. 1945"; 286/1181, 
British Consul in Patras, 29 Aug. 1946; Grigoriadis, 1964: 5. 184-185; 
Kofos, 1964: 124; Mitsopoulos, 1987: 32; Woodhouse, 1948: 91-93. 
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Coercion was needed nearly everywhere by EAM/ELAS in order to 
deter informers, suppress crime, and extract requisitions and levies. 
Military force became an increasingly important component of its 
_ authority as ELAS expanded steadily, during 1943 and 1944, through 
the mountain villages of the Peloponnese, Roumeli, Thessaly and 
Macedonia. Some kapetanioi were thugs who terrorised their respective 
localities. The KKE leaders realised that such people discredited EAM, 
but lacked the means to check them before they did irreparable damage. 
An added difficulty was that a prominent offender was the most famous 
of guerrilla leaders, Aris Velouchiotis, who was hard to control because 
of his prestige within ELAS. Nearly all of the key regional and district 
officials of EAM were communists who, as such, were unwilling to 
tolerate other values, and were embittered towards the old political order 
by their pre-war experience of persecution. Feeling surrounded by 
enemies, they saw rival resistance groups as agents of the British or the 
Axis, or simply as competitors for scarce resources. It was in the same 
sPirit that the communist leaders ordered attacks on EDES. In 1944, as 
EAM gained ground at the expense of the quisling administration, its 
agents assassinated and executed supporters of other organisations with 
-increasing frequency. 25 
After the Metaxas regime was destroyed by German invasion, the 
strongest champions of the traditional order were at first the quisling 
administrations. Until April 1943 they were dominated by a dissident 
sector of the Metaxist establishment which was Germanophile and quite 
talented. Many of the Germanophiles had supported King Constantine's 
pro-German stance in the First World War, or had been educated in 
Germany, or (if they were businessmen) depended on German markets 
or investments. Politically dominant at first were several of Metaxas's 
generals such as the first prime minister Georgios Tsolakoglou.26 
While persecuting the associates of the dead Metaxas, Tsolakoglou and 
his ministers held values similar to his. Like him, they disliked 
political parties, and revered the concepts of social order, family, 
2SChatzis, 1977-1979: 2.288, 503; Couvaras, 1982: 65, 71; 
Grigoriadis, 1964: 5.201-202; Ioannidis, 1979: 200-201; Kasimatis et 
al., 1988: 364-365; Peltekis archives, file 6, 01, p. 7g, Capt. M. Ward, 
"RiJ!ort on visit to Greece, 21 Oct.-25 Dec. 1943"; Sarafis, 1980: p. Ix. 
Aeischer, 1988: 354-355. 363; Archer.1944: 204; Hondros. 1983: 78. 
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religion, country. Like Metaxas, Tsolakoglou impressed on the police 
their exalted role as representatives of state authority. The 
administration headed from April 1943 by Ioannis Rallis differed from 
its predecessors in being dominated by professional politicians, who as 
a group had been persecuted by the Metaxas regime, and for the most 
part favoured a return to a parliamentary system after the war. 
Consequently this government was better known and trusted than its 
predecessors by politicians and local party bosses. 
The quisling prime ministers claimed that their aim was to 
continue essential services, maintain law and order, and intercede with 
the enemy on behalf of their countrymen. In these tasks they won 
considerable sympathy from what might be called the official 
establishment, or in other words all those whose appointment was 
controlled or influenced by the pre-war government for example, public 
officials, army and police officers, directors of major banks, judges, 
university professors, bishops, officials of co-operative associations and 
trade unions. Also sympathetic were those institutions which had been 
obliged to co-operate closely with the pre-war government: chambers of 
commerce, manufacturers' associations, and professional associations. 
Army officers continued to draw salaries, and many senior ones received 
official appointments. Most bourgeois politicians acknowledged that 
the quisling governments were performing some valuable functions.27 
Within the quisling administrations there was a spectrum of 
responses to the enemy, from effective collaboration to covert 
obstruction. Willing collaborators were few because the enemy 
occupation was extremely harsh. Thus influential resistance 
organisations could operate within the administration: National 
Revolution (EE) based in Athens, and Defenders of Northern Greece 
(YBE, later PAO) based in Salonika. Each recruited hundreds of 
supporters from high-ranking officials, especially army officers.28 Of 
those who collaborated with the enemy, few felt devotion to Nazi 
Germany or to fascist ideals. Some prominent members of the quisling 
administrations (like Georgios Merkouris, who was appointed Governor 
27Tsolakoglou, 1959: 163; Logothetopou}os, 1948: 33; Antonakeas, 
1945: 30-32, Rallis, 1947: 23-24, 78. 
28Papathanasiou, 1988: 1. 46-47, 312-313; Antonakeas, 1945: 11-12. 
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of the National Bank) claimed to be fascists, or adhered to fascist 
groups. But fascism in Greece had limited meaning: for example, its 
advocates had to eschew militant nationalism, and seem to have held 
conventional religious values. The fascist groups which had existed 
before they were suppressed by Metaxas, and reappeared after the 
German invasion, were treated with contempt by most right-wing 
Greeks and even by the Germans themselves. Consequently they lost 
significance early in the occupation.29 
Another body which was active in collaboration was the 
gendarmerie, or rather a large part of it. The Special Security had been 
established by the Venizelos government in 1929 to persecute 
communists and other political opponents, and grew to a well-equipped 
force of 1,645 under Metaxas. Now it was relied on by the quisling 
administrations to persecute resisters in the cities. In addition, ordinary 
gendarmes were regularly employed for this and other forms of 
collaboration, including the requisitioning of food for Axis troops. In 
1944 many were employed in combat against resisters. Yet it is clear 
that most gendarmes served the Germans only under duress. If they 
failed to do so, loss of livelihood was the least they had to fear: torture, 
execution, and reprisals against their families were likely penalties. 
Thus the enemy executed 782 during the occupation, out of a total force 
of about 14,000. Most gendarmes helped resisters (at least non-
communist ones) if they could. Seven hundred defected to EDES; and an 
estimated 1,600 even defected to EAM/ELAS (though probably some of 
these were coerced). Even the Special Security showed reluctance to 
collaborate. The Rallis government could not find a qualified officer 
willing to command it, and had to appoint a junior officer dismissed 
long before for political reasons. The city police was still more 
reluctant. The chief of its Athens branch, Evangelos Evert, repeatedly 
evaded orders to act even against communist resisters yet avoided 
dismissal by Rallis because he was valued by the British, whose 
officers he assisted. Thus he kept his force of 3,000 untarnished for use 
by a free Greek government against EAM after the liberation. The zeal 
which some gendarmes showed in military collaboration with the 
29Close, 1990b: 16; NARS, Dept. of State, R. & A. 872, report 26 
April 1943; Fleischer, 1988: 359-360. 
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Germans, in 1943-1944, was mainly due to anti-communism. While 
keeping systematic watch over communists, most of their colleagues, 
however-including at least some in the Special Security-tried to 
avoid betraying them to the Germans.30 
From the start of the occupation, the quisling administration 
devoted much effort to resisting attempts by the occupation forces to 
dismember northern Greece. After the German invasion, the Bulgarians 
effectively annexed Thrace and eastern Macedonia, while the Italians 
annexed northern Epirus and the Ionian Islands. The Bulgarians then 
encouraged separatist feeling among Slavophones in western 
Macedonia, while Italians did likewise among the Romanian-speaking 
Koutsovlachs in western Thessaly and western Macedonia, as well as 
among the Chams (Albanian Muslims) of western Epirus. The 
occupation forces offered these minorities inducements to collaborate, in 
the form of food rations, posts in local administration, or employment 
in militia forces. The Greek police and other officials worked 
strenuously, and often at risk to their own lives, to thwart these 
separatist activities. Later, they were alarmed by the sympathy which 
EAM showed to Slavophones in western Macedonia. Understandably, 
then, the collaborationist administrations and the conservative resisters 
felt a sense of mission about the preservation of Hellenism in the 
north.31 
Rallis pursued another mission as well: the prevention of 
communist takeover before the British arrived. To this end he used his 
official authority, and his influence with the Germans, in an attempt to 
reconstruct the Greek military forces, in a form which became known as 
security battalions. Hoping to make them a bulwark of respectable 
society, he managed to recruit many youths of rich families, 
presumably as officers (Rallis, 1947: 65; Zalokostas, n.d.: 288). His 
obvious hope was to revive state authority, and make himself necessary 
after liberation to other anti-communist groups, to which he tried to 
30Daskalakis, 1973: 1. 251-252, 289; Katsimanglis, 1974: 151; 
Ral1is, 1947: 116-117; Spais, 1970: 262; FO 371/37204/25, R 7213· 
Zoidis et al., 1967: 235. ' 
31 Arseniou, 1977: 1.69; Daskalakis, 1973: 1. 249-250, 265-268, 
274, 286-287, 290, 294; Papathanasiou, 1988: 1. 20-23; Rallis, 1947: 
141; Troebst, 1989: 259. 
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''build bridges, by for example helping the resistance leader Dimitrios 
Psarros, as well as members of EDES, and British officers in hiding. 
Possibly he believed what he and the commanders of the security 
battalions repeatedly told their officers, which is that they enjoyed tacit 
;British approval (Hondros, 1989: 265,271-273). Rallis's initial aims 
in establishing the security battalions earned widespread sympathy from 
bourgeois politicians and respectable society. Besides Rallis, who had 
been an extreme monarchist, an influential group of republican 
politicians, who included Rallis's Minister of the Interior Anastasios 
Tavoularis and were associated with the ex-dictator Theodoros Pangalos, 
planned to use the battalions for their own ends.32 
The Germans thwarted the politicians' schemes, arresting the 
Pangalos group for their contacts with resisters, and bringing the 
majority of the battalions under their direct command and close 
supervision (Fleischer, 1980-1982: 190, 193). The SS Commander in 
.Greece eventually reported that the strength of the security battalions 
reached 22,350-a figure which excluded several thousand irregular 
~fighters in bands raised directly by the Germans in Macedonia, and on a 
lesser scale in Thessaly. The collaborationist forces operated chiefly in 
the Peloponnese, Roumeli, Attica, and central and western Macedonia. 
Of the thousand or so army officers in these units, some were 
. Venizelists who had been forcibly retired in the 1930s and were lured 
back into service by restitution of rank and pay. Eventually, however, a 
majority were monarchists who were pressed into service, often by 
,threats such as loss of salary. Many recruits were refugees from 
resistance bands dissolved by ELAS-an illustration of the widespread 
tendency in 1944 for people to seek security in one armed group or 
. another. The Germans, for the bands which they themselves raised, were 
. forced to recruit criminals or disreputable characters: the commander of 
one unit, the illiterate ex-chauffeur Dangoulas, became known as "the 
beast of Salonika", and was considered by a police officer as a "disgrace" 
to the city (Eleftheria, 1965: 31 January, 15). In all collaborationist 
units the majority of privates were motivated simply by economic need. 
So were the masses of humble informers on whom the Germans relied 
32Anagnostopoulos, 1950-1973: 2.381; Peltekis archive, file 7, no. 
63, S. Apostolidis, 2 Nov. 1945. 
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throughout the occupation. For example, Lt.-Col. Nicholas Hammond 
reported that, in Salonika in July 1943, the Germans employed "mainly 
youths, waiters and concierges".33 
The collaborationist troops became ruthless both in combating 
ELAS, and also in terrorising and plundering civilians. These atrocities, 
and their association with the Germans, caused many to become 
demoralised, and made the collaborationist troops extremely unpopular 
even among communities which had originally sought their protection. 
These moral weaknesses help to explain why ELAS quickly 
overpowered the forces after the Germans' withdrawal (Douatzis, 1982: 
58-64, 247; Kanellopoulos, 1977: 654). 
Another type of collaborator consisted of those businessmen who 
profited by fulfilling contracts for the Germans or by black-
marketeering, amidst conditions of desperate want for most people. The 
traditional dependence of businessmen on official favour seems to have 
become greater than ever in the difficult conditions of the occupation; 
and certain quisling ministers were closely associated with profiteers. 
There was a conspicuous group of businessmen who made large 
fortunes, and these included parvenus as well as old-established 
businessmen. But there were many smaller-scale profiteers as well, 
among whom merchants and retailers of food were numerous 
(Antonakeas, 1945: 28, 34-35; Papathanasiou, 1988: 1. 104). In pro-
vincial towns, businessmen or bankers were among the leaders of local 
society whose co-operation was normally sought by occupying troops. 
The proportion of the total population which in some way profited 
from the occupation was estimated by the Germans at about 10% in 
mid-1943. They were obviously doomed if EAM came to power; and 
seemed likely to drag down with them urban capitalists as a whole. 
Thus it was for their own survival that manufacturers and black 
marketeers contributed lavishly to the funding of the security battalions, 
and indeed diverted to them the funds which they had formerly donated 
to conservative resistance groups. When, for example, security 
battalionists paraded through Athens on New Year's Day, 1944, they 
330ouatzis, 1982: 27; Eleftheria, 1965: 26 January, 5 and 31 January, 
15; Fleischer, 1980-1982: 192; FO 371/37204/ 25, R 7213, Hammond; 
Grigoriadis, 1964: 3. 312-314; Psychoundakis, 1955: 155-156. 
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,were applauded by inhabitants of the wealthier quarters.34 
, , Nearly all politicians-estimated in total by one of them, 
}{bmninos Pyromaglou (1975: 330), at about eight hundred-had been 
'denied the practice of their profession since the establishment of the 
::Metaxas dictatorship in 1936. Those of front rank had also been kept 
Under confinement, and thus were seriously out of touch with public 
~ion, and more particularly with their local agents and supporters. 
Now, their professional training and their personal circumstances made 
it hard for them to engage in any sort of resistance activity; and during 
'iM first two years of the occupation very few did so, except a few rather 
~influential politicians in EAM. By 1943, the success of EAM in 
;'.awbilising their former supporters threatened to prevent most 
~"peliticians from ever returning to their old vocation. Several, led by the 
~'dder statesman Sofoulis, tried too late to organise a resistance group 
~~bich might contain EAM. Late in 1943, the same task was attempted 
~.;tiy diverse representatives of the old order in Athens, including some 
~liticians, several minor resistance organisations, nouveaux riches 
:jrofiteers, old-established businessmen and bankers, and the head of the 
j~urch, Archbishop Damaskinos, whom most wanted to act as 
:~head of a united front. But these people were disunited by, among 
~jther things, their political ambitions, and by disagreement over 
#elations with the monarchy and with the security battalions. By 
'January 1944, businessmen tended to seek salvation in the security 
~ttalions, while politicians looked with increasing hope to the British 
~jnd their client government in Cairo. When George Papandreou escaped 
~tifCairo to become prime minister of this government in April, several 
it'her politicians accompanied or followed him. Thus the government-
~~le acquired authority for the frrst time in Greece, and became the 
~~ying-point for the national camp.35 
;:1.-' Senior officers of the regular army also reacted, belatedly, to the 
,~llenge posed by EAM. Although themselves , they showed 
$~asing willingness to overlook their differences with Venizelist 
,:'~ 34Arseniou, 1977: 2.228-289; Papakonstantinou, 1952: 211; Thoma-
,?dakis, 1981: 67-69, 75; Zoidis et al., 1967: 234. 
:,i::' 35Benetatos, 1963: 136; Chatzis, 1977-1979: 2. 178-182, 292, 294, 
r361; FO 371/37207/240, R 11752; 371/37208.166, R 12331; 371/ 
~3689!11, R 10083. 
20 DH. Close 
officers. In May 1943, the former Commander-in-Chief Alexandros 
Papagos, with five other generals who had held aloof from the quisling 
government, established the Military Hierarchy to encourage officers to 
participate in resistance activity, and in doing so to defend the threatened 
social order. Although the six generals were arrested in July. their 
organisation continued to function and in time enrolled 2,500 officers-
possibly a majority of professional officers on the active list in 
Greece.36 Many junior officers had from patriotic motives begun 
resistance activity earlier in the occupation. During 1943 hundreds more 
officers formed guerrilla bands in the Peloponnese, Sterea Ellada, 
Epirus, and central and western Macedonia. It is clear that a large 
proportion of the officers who thus became active in 1943 were mainly 
interested in combating ELAS.37 By the end of 1943, about 2,500 
others had joined the exiled army in Egypt. They included Konstantinos 
Ventiris, a committed Venizelist and leader of an anti-communist 
resistance group in Athens. He now became Chief of General Staff 
under Papandreou, and a link between fervent anti-communists in Egypt 
and Greece. He secured the appointment of one colleague, the 
monarchist Thrasyvoulos Tsakalotos, to command the Mountain 
Brigade (the main Greek unit operating with the allied armies after April 
1944), and another monarchist colleague, Panayotis SpHiotopoulos, to 
co-ordinate the anti-communist forces in Athens in the last two months 
of the occupation. Spiliotopoulos in turn ensured the co-operation of 
the members of the Military Hierarchy, and of the police when they 
finally cut their links with the quisling administration (Leontaritis, 
1986: 14-15; Margaritis, 1984: 177-178). Ventiris, Tsakalotos, and 
Spiliotopoulos would all play prominent roles on the national side in 
the civil war in 1946-1949. They sympathised with the anti-
communism of officers in the security battalions, as probably did most 
officers of the regular army and most ministers in Papandreou's 
government before EAM joined it. Seeing that they might need to use 
the security battalions against EAM, Papandreou and the British 
36Chatzis, 1977-1979: 1. 376-379; Grigoropoulos, 1966: 262; Zalo-
kostas, n.d.: 102. 
37Baitogiannis, 1986: 156; Gerolymatos, 1989: 293; Margaritis, 
1989: 510; Peltekis archive, file 6, no. 8, Lt-Col. R.P. McMullen, 15 Feb. 
1944; Zalokostas, n.d.: 102. 
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.Headquarters in the Middle East refrained for eight vital months (6 
January - 6 September 1944) from denouncing them.38 
By November 1943, all except two of the guerrilla bands formed by 
army officers had been dissolved by ELAS. The two were EKKA, 
which survived precariously north of the Gulf of Corinth amidst ELAS 
forces, and EDES, which by January was confined by ELAS pressure 
mainly to western Epirus. Both depended on British supplies. EKKA 
may have reached a strength of eight hundred combatants, but was 
destroyed in April 1944 by ELAS kapetanioi who massacred perhaps 
over four hundred of its members and supporters. EDES reached a peak 
of 7,000 combatants in 1944, and was eventually dispersed by ELAS 
after the liberation. Each organisation was founded in 1941 by a 
Venizelist officer: EDES by Napoleon Zervas, an adventurer of 
indeterminate but anti-communist principles like his former associate 
Pangalos, and Dimitrios Psarros, who, like his old friend Sarafis 
(military commander of ELAS) had been forcibly retired in 1935 and 
had since adopted social democratic ideas. Both organisations lost their 
radical and republican character; and indeed, from the autumn of 1943, 
became a haven for right-wing officers and police who were escaping 
from or fighting against ELAS. Other such officers fought against 
ELAS in the streets of Athens and Piraeus, as participants in 
monarchist organisations like ED or "X". The ferocity of this feuding is 
indicated by the statement of a member of ED, Christos Zalokostas, in 
September 1944, that EAM militiamen were "murdering on average 
two [of our lads] each day, officers, young students, officer-cadets".39 
By 1944, the varied representatives of the old order felt a sense of 
common purpose in resisting the apparent dictatorial ambitions of 
EAM. But this stance increasingly implied defence of a social and 
political order which offered little hope for the post-war period. 
Admittedly, many anti-communists, including some who were socially 
conservative, hoped for a fairer society after the war. Indeed, given the 
poverty being suffered by most of the population, all political 
38Chatzis, 1977-1979: 2. 192; Gdgoropoulos, 1966: 266; Hondros, 
1989: 270-271; Papastratis, 1984: 211; Spais. 1970: 264. 
39Zalokostas, n.d.: 94, 232, 289; Arapis, 1988: 20-24; Daskalakis, 
1973: 1. 189; Hondros, 1983: 105, 140; Papagiannopoulos, 1981: 90, 
144; Papathanasiou. 1988: 2. 576-577; Pyromaglou. 1975: 305-307. 
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organisations had to make generous promises of social welfare. EDES 
and EKKA, for example, each at first adopted social democratic 
programmes, as did Papandreou before he became prime minister. But 
the groups opposed to EAM made few preparations to implement their 
promises, and neglected them as they became part of an alliance in 
which the most cohesive and determined element consisted of 
conservative army officers. Such officers distrusted political 
programmes as a distraction from their military objectives, and as likely 
to arouse latent divisions between monarchists and republicans. The 
poverty of their policies gave conservative groups additional motive to 
bang the nationalist drum by alleging that EAM wanted to alienate 
Slav-occupied areas in the north, and by holding out the specious 
prospect of territorial expansion at the expense of Albania and 
Bulgaria.40 
The conservatives' lack of programme was symptomatic of their 
weakness in political organisation, which in tum was epitomised by 
EDES in Epirus. Fortified by gold sovereigns and supplies from the 
British, Zervas enlarged EDES by laborious negotiations with local 
notables, and by enlisting the help in various regions of old military 
acquaintances. He held EDES together by personal authority; but 
lacking political ideals, and bad at choosing subordinates, he failed to 
organise it effectively.41 The case of EDES shows how inadequate were 
the political methods characteristic of the old order. As a result of the 
conservatives' political incapacity, their organisations in the metropolis 
were fragmented, and the distribution of their bands in the provinces 
was haphazard. The bands were, for example, comparatively numerous 
in the Peloponnese because a disproportionate number of professional 
officers hailed from this region. The efforts in 1943 of the Panhellenic 
Liberation Organisation (PAO) in Salonika, and of National Action 
(ED) in Athens, to send officers "to the mountains" to form bands were 
feeble by ELAS' s standards. The organisations lacked funds, and the 
officers lacked a supply system, or understanding of guerrilla warfare. 
40FO 371/43699/131, R 21461; Kasimatis el al .• 1988: 124-130; 
Papathanasiou, 1988: 1. 105, 140, 144, 163-165; 2. 576-577; Pyro-
maglou, 1975: 305-307. 
41 Baerentzen, 1982: 126-128, 153-154; Baltogiannis. 1986: 160-
162. 179; PO 371/37204/26, R 7213; Pyromaglou, 1975: 312-313. 
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'Thus it was partly for lack of an effective alternative at this time that 
some hundreds of professional officers, who included some monarchists, 
joined ELAS.42 
Because of their weakness, the conservative organisations could not 
help the people who in all parts of the country clamoured for protection 
, against EAM/ELAS. Many villages saw EAM/ELAS as a menace 
beCause it taxed them and provoked enemy reprisals. Usually, however, 
they had to defend themselves, some by force and with fortifications. In 
eastern Macedonia, it was only at the initiative of a British liaison 
officer that Greek army officers were brought from Salonika in 1944 to 
staff the anti-EAM bands of Anton Tsaous and others, who for their 
, part were reluctant to accept outside leaders. Rallis as prime minister 
,received appeals for protection from various regions, especially from 
local notables-such as presidents of communities, lawyers, party 
agents, businessmen, state officials-who had either represented the 
Metaxas regime, or before then supported the bourgeois parties.43 
In the political vacuum created in 1941 by the German invasion, 
the sole dynamic force among Greeks was the Communist party. An 
aspect of this dynamism was aggressiveness, and it was this 
aggressiveness, more than any factor, which accounts for the civil strife 
which broke out in all parts of the country. It fuelled the expansionism 
of EAM which created a common interest between an authoritarian 
monarchist like Rallis and a social democrat like Psarros. By the time 
of liberation, there were few localities where EAM and representatives 
of the old political order did not regard each other with fear and hatred. 
, Among these few were some islands, such as Chios, Samos, and Crete, 
where hostilites were perhaps restrained by a sense of community and of 
regional patriotism. Even here, tensions were soon heightened by the 
effects of conflict elsewhere.44 
Mter the Germans' withdrawal, the newly arrived government of 
420rigoriadis. 1964: 3. 31; PO 371/37205/46, R 8725; 371/ 
37206/137, R 10450, 10454; Papathanasiou, 1988: 2. 716-717. 
43Arseniou, 1977: 2. 209, 227; PO 371/37204/113, R 7535; Papa-
'thanasiou, 1988: 2. 580, 653-655; Rallis. 1947: 146-147; Sarafis, 1980: 
145. 
44Argenti, 1966: 106-109; Carabott, 1989: 314; PO 371/43695/12, R 
18615; Woodhouse, 1948: 89. 
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Papandreou wielded authority only over EDES territory, some islands, 
and the metropolitan region which had been ceded to it militarily by 
EAM/ELAS. Everywhere else, the latter retained or assumed authority. 
After its clashes with collaborators in the wake of the German retreat, 
EAM/ELAS imposed strict order. While refraining from executions or 
looting, it jailed many alleged collaborators, and picketed the main 
roads. Thus two political systems confronted each other, the chasm 
between them bridged precariously by the presence of six EAM 
ministers in Papandreou's government. In effect this was an example of 
the "multiple sovereignty" which, according to Charles Tilly, 
characterises a revolutionary situation (Tilly, 1978: 191). During the 
month after the Germans' final withdrawal. the two sides strengthened 
themselves militarily, and made no progress in negotiations on 
demobilisation of forces (Papathanasio!l, 1988: 2.687; Zafiropoulos, 
1956: 1. 80). After these negotiations reached an impasse, open 
fighting erupted-for independent reasons-on 1 December in eastern 
Macedonia, and on 3 December in Athens (Alexander, 1981: 164-165; 
Konstantaras, 1964: 300). There followed the iargest bout of conflict so 
far; and this led ultimately to one of the most intense of the many civil 
wars which Europe has seen this century. 
David H. Close 
Flinders University of South Australia 
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